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Summary 
Democracy promises intrastate peace therefore post-civil war societies are often pre-
scribed democratization. However, in ethnically divided societies building democratic 
institutions where all former warring parties operate is tantamount to an impertinent 
demand. In many cases at least one of the conflict parties refuses to be a single demos 
together with the other party and coexist with it in the same political community. There 
can, however, be no success in building or remodeling democratic institutions as long as 
one of the conflicting parties rejects the state, its borders or internal structures. Likewise, 
an absence of common democratic institutions prevents all the conflicting parties from 
accepting the state as their own. In the context of these considerations the present report 
discusses whether democratization in Macedonia has succeeded in making progress after 
the fighting in 2001 and fulfilling the promise of peace through democracy. 
In 2001 the (Albanian) National Liberation Army (UÇK) attacked the Macedonian se-
curity forces. Initially, it also promoted secessionist objectives but later it restricted itself 
to demands for empowerment of Albanians in Macedonia. The fighting came to an end 
with the Ohrid Agreement between the largest Macedonian and Albanian parties. The 
peace agreement required the dissolution of the UÇK and promised comprehensive re-
forms of state institutions in return.  
Macedonia enjoyed initially a relatively favorable environment for democratization 
because the government institutions where Macedonian and Albanian parties shared 
power had persisted even during the fighting. Hence the subsequent democratization only 
required a remodeling of common institutions rather than having to set up new ones 
from scratch. A large majority of Albanians accepted the Republic of Macedonia but not 
its old structures. Even so, Albanian politicians avoided showing their loyalty to Mace-
donia. The majority of Macedonian citizens wanted Macedonia to be their nation-state 
and rejected the reforms envisaged in the Ohrid Agreement. Therefore it appeared ques-
tionable that the formula of “peace for more rights” could work. 
However, many of the remodeling measures in state institutions as envisaged in the 
peace agreement were implemented after 2001. Moreover, the UÇK disbanded itself and 
its political leadership established a new Albanian party that in 2002 joined the Macedo-
nian government against which it had fought just a year and a half earlier. Advances in 
democratization were achieved although the Macedonians rejected the new definition of 
the Republic and institutional reforms. The prospect of accession to the European Union 
cancelled out the lack of acceptance for the conceived institutional order. A very large 
majority of Macedonian citizens wanted the integration, which was used by the European 
Union to press for implementation of the Ohrid Agreement. Without the implementation 
of this agreement there could be no further convergence. Once the provisions of the peace 
agreement were implemented Albanian citizens and politicians started to show greater 
commitment to the Republic of Macedonia. Nevertheless, they continued to shun the 
national flag and venerate Albanian symbols. But the number of opponents of the agree-
ment diminished because of increasing avowals of loyalty by the Albanians and the reali-
zation that the Macedonians’ fears of being degraded proved to be unfounded. In the last 
  II
few years only fringe organizations or politicians consistently repudiated the Ohrid 
Agreement or the common state. 
Despite some improvements Macedonia even in 2009 exhibited a democracy deficit in 
some respects. Violent incidents and irregularities overshadowed the most recent parlia-
mentary elections. The ruling parties sought to fill public service jobs with their supporters. 
Independence of judges remained precarious. Multiple boycotts of parliamentary sessions 
presented another problem. However, most of these shortcomings stemmed neither from 
insufficient acceptance of the common democracy, nor from interethnic conflict but from 
the legacy of the long authoritarian rule and a lack of democratic attitudes in the political 
elite. 
The largest source of potential destabilization in 2009 was the quarrel over the name of 
Macedonia with Greece, which threatened to block Euro-Atlantic integration. Politicians 
and experts thought that the fundamental consensus holding the Republic together was at 
risk. If accession to the European Union remains barred, the acceptance of the Ohrid 
Agreement as well as a common democracy would possibly diminish. 
The report advises the international presence in Macedonia not to circumvent the 
rules of democracy in its efforts to mediate between the ethnic groups and political par-
ties. In the quarrel over the name of Macedonia with Greece both parties should be urged 
to exercise restraint so that the success story of the Macedonian peace process does not 
come to a bitter end after all. Despite the hitherto relative success Macedonia is hardly a 
suitable model for democratization in other post-civil war societies because the condi-
tions for its success are absent in most of the other cases. 
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1. Introduction1 
“Impositions and promises” is the subtitle of a collection of theses on democracy (Möllers 
2008). One of the central promises of democracy is that it protects both international and 
intrastate peace. The international political community has so much faith in this promise 
that it often declares the promotion of democracy to be a strategy for peace. Hence, since 
the end of the Cold War democratization has been one of the standard requirements in 
agreements that are expected to put an end to intrastate wars (Paris 2004: 5). This report 
discusses to what extent democratization might deliver regarding its promise of peace. 
However, it does not deal with its dark sides, which could jeopardize peace both inside 
and between states (Gromes 2007: 70-94; Jarstad/Sisk 2008; Mann 2005; Müller/Geis/ 
Wagner 2007). It is rather a question of whether the undertaking of democratization 
could succeed and produce a democracy. Here the focus is on democratization of ethni-
cally divided societies that have experienced an armed conflict in their recent past.2 
The fact that there was such a conflict in Macedonia in 2001 is not surprising, but it is 
nevertheless remarkable. An armed conflict in Macedonia is a reminder of the two wars in 
the Balkans at the beginning of the last century that had to do with the “Macedonian 
question”. Yet at the end of the same century only the Republic of Macedonia had 
succeeded in seceding peacefully from the disintegrating Yugoslavia. At that time Mace-
donia seemed to be more of a model and less of a powder keg in two respects at once: the 
fact that Macedonian parties always built governments with an Albanian party paved the 
way for a peaceful settlement in ethnically divided societies. Moreover, the United 
Nations boasted about having kept Macedonia away from the maelstrom of Yugolavia’s 
disintegration wars with the help of peacekeepers. Yet when the Albanian National Lib-
eration Army (UÇK) attacked the Macedonian security forces at the beginning of 2001 
the country risked descending “from the success story to a heap of ruins” (Hatschikjan 
2001). The Ohrid Agreement put a stop to the armed conflict in August 2001. Here  
democratization was also deemed to be a tried and tested means for securing the peace. 
Could it succeed in putting Macedonia back on the path to success? 
If there are any necessary preconditions for successful democratization at all, scholars 
of democracy see them in the existence of a state, on the one hand: “no state, no democ-
racy” (Munck 2004: 72). Democracy needs a state to implement political decisions (Tilly 
2007: 11). On the other hand, an advanced level of nation-building is considered a pre-
requisite for successful democratization (Berg-Schlosser 2004: 14). Democracy functions 
 
 
1  I thank Tome Sandevski, Aleksandra Stojkovski and Merle Vetterlein for their suggestions about field 
research in Macedonia. Additionally, Henri Bohnet from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Nena 
Trajkovska from the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, as well as political scientists Židas Daskalovski and 
Dane Taleski helped me a lot in Skopje. I am grateful to all my interviewees. I would also like to thank 
Claudia Baumgart-Ochse, Cemal Karakaş, Bernhard Moltmann, Tome Sandevski, Hajo Schmidt and 
Bruno Schoch for constructive criticism. 
2  This project resulted in a case study about Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is also available as a HSFK 
Report (Gromes 2008). 
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only if all significant groups accept the borders of the political community and the 
definition of the demos.3 Dankwart Rustow (1970: 351-353) believed that the only 
“background condition” for democracy was that the majority of the population would 
know to which political community it belonged and would not reject it. 
Indeed, some societies still have institutions of government after civil wars between 
ethnically defined parties that were terminated in peace agreements. But at least one party 
does not see them as common structures and at least one party to the conflict operates 
primarily outside of these institutions. Consequently, democratization requires that such 
structures of the state be made available where all parties to the conflict would operate. To 
this end the institutions of government have to be reestablished or at least altered (state-
building). This report will not deal with each and every form of design for structures 
of the state, but will instead concentrate exclusively on state-building as a subtask of 
democratization of ethnically divided post-civil war societies. 
What is mostly missing after a civil war between ethnically defined parties, is accep-
tance of the definition of the demos, of the structure of the state or even the common state 
itself. The parties to the conflict face each other in their hardened particular identities and 
at least one party opposes building a nation together with the other one. To recall Bene-
dict Anderson (1988: 15-17): one of the conflicting parties does not even want to imagine 
a political community with the other party. It perceives a common democracy more as an 
impertinent demand and less as a promise and obstructs the reconstruction or modifica-
tion of state institutions. Therefore, democratization in ethnically divided post-civil war 
societies faces the challenge of creating a modicum of mutual recognition so that com-
mon institutions can function. It requires that enemies start to regard each other as politi-
cal opponents and a sense of belonging emerges to overarch or reduce the weight of the 
forcibly cemented particularist identities. I call this transition nation-building.4 
Given the assumed necessary conditions for a successful democratization on the one 
hand, and the initial situation in ethnically divided post-civil war societies on the other 
hand, democratization has to cope with the dual task of state-building and nation-
building. To this end there are three options available: 
One option is to concentrate on nation-building first and subsequently build or 
modify a common democratic state. But where should the notion of the political commu-
nity come from if ethnic groups remain gridlocked in confrontation with each other in 
their fixed cemented identities, fears and mistrust? Oftentimes in history it was the state 
that showed different groups that they shared a social space. Thus, over time, these groups 
perceived themselves as a political community. But the common state or its structure is 
 
 
3  Anselm et al. (1999); Bendel/Krennerich (2003); Merkel (1999); Schmitter (1994); Shain/Linz (1995). 
4 There are many definitions of nation-building (see Hippler 2004: 14-20) that equate it either with democrati-
zation, or with the building of new states, or with consolidation of peace by military means. Other con-
cepts describe nation-building as the emergence of a state-wide identity, which supersedes particularist 
ethnic identities. In this report nation-building means a process at the end of which the conflicting parties 
no longer dismiss the notion that together they constitute a political community. 
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the central object of the conflict in societies after a civil war between ethnically defined 
parties. Nation-building should bring about the very acceptance of the common state and 
therefore it cannot be based on state-building. 
The other option would be to try it the opposite way and first furnish the common 
democratic structures of the state in order to pave the way for nation-building. But 
without the collaboration of all conflicting parties the institutions laid out for democracy 
would remain empty shells. However, the willingness of working in these institutions 
depends on the acceptance of the state and the definition of the demos embodied in its 
institutions. Therefore, building or remodeling the state in the framework of democrati-
zation requires advances in nation-building but it cannot generate them. 
The remaining third option is pursuing state-building and nation-building at the same 
time. History offers many examples of how the availability of state institutions can pro-
mote the sense of national community, or conversely of how the existence of such a sense 
of belonging builds institutions of the state and breathes life into them (Breuilly 1999; 
Reinhard 2000; Schulze 1994). But under the initial conditions of ethnically divided post-
civil war societies and the requirement of democratization these interrelations look like a 
vicious circle: a lack of common democratic institutions obstructs nation-building while 
lack of acceptance of the common state hinders state-building.5 
This report discusses whether the conjectured vicious circle of state-building and 
nation-building has constrained (further) democratization in Macedonia. If not, how was 
it possible to advance the building or remodeling of the common democracy although the 
largest ethnic groups disagreed about the structure of the common state? The report 
describes the starting position for democratization and discusses the roles of the course of 
conflict, the envisaged institutions, the economic development as well as the influence of 
international factors, first and foremost among them, the prospect of accession to the 
European Union. 
Firstly, the report gives a summary of the armed conflict in Macedonia (Chapter 2) and 
reviews how to assess the level achieved in the establishment of democratic institutions and 
nation-building (Chapter 3). It then describes the starting position for democratization after 
the peace agreement was signed (Chapter 4). The subsequent chapters (Chapters 5 and 6) 
deal with two phases (2002-2006, 2006-2009) and discuss the link between the establish-
ment of democratic institutions and nation-building separately for each of the phases. The 
closing chapter (Chapter 7) evaluates the democratization in the light of the conjectured 
vicious circle, outlines potential sources of destabilization and offers policy recommendations. 
 
 
5  Not all democratic deficiencies in ethnically divided post-civil-war societies can be attributed to this 
vicious circle. By the same token, advances in democratization offer little assurance of a constructive conflict 
process (Gromes 2007: 70-94). 
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2.  The armed conflict in Macedonia 
There are several Macedonias: the ancient Macedonia of Alexander the Great, the Mace-
donia shaped by the Ottoman Empire, a region which also included parts of the current 
states of Albania, Bulgaria and Greece, a province in the northern part of Greece, and 
finally the state which calls itself the Republic of Macedonia but in many texts is referred 
to as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The subject of this report is 
this state that I will simply call Macedonia for the sake of brevity.6 
Macedonia is a multi-ethnic, multilingual and multireligous state. In the 2002 popula-
tion census 64.2% of the country’s two million citizens identified themselves as Macedo-
nians, 25.2% as Albanians, 3.9% as Turks, 2.7% as Roma and 1.8% as Serbs (Oschlies 
2003: 1). All these people count as Macedonians in the sense of being citizens of Mace-
donia, only some two thirds of them call themselves Macedonians in the ethnic sense. If 
later in this report Macedonians are mentioned, this term refers to the largest ethnic 
group. The majority of Macedonians speak Macedonian, use the Cyrillic alphabet7 and 
just like most of the Serbs belong to Orthodox Christianity. The Albanians, on the other 
hand, speak the Albanian language, use the Latin alphabet and most of them share the 
Muslim faith with the majority of the Turks and Roma. While the Macedonians live all 
over the state territory, the Albanians are concentrated in the northern and northwestern 
regions and in the capital of Skopje (Daskalovski 2006: 62f). The 2002 census showed that 
almost two thirds of the citizens resided in census districts where a single ethnic group 
constituted at least 80% of the population.8 Macedonia is marked less by interaction or 
mixing between ethnic groups and more by their parallel existence (Hislope 2003: 134). In 
2008 only seven percent of weddings resulted in mixed marriages, 95% of the Macedonians 
and 96% of the Albanians found a marriage partner from their own ethnic group (Republic 
of Macedonia State Statistical Office 2009: 36). 
Nevertheless, until early 2001, Macedonia was considered a model for inter-ethnic 
settlement and an example of successful prevention of violence. A deadly attack with 
grenades on January 22, 2001 disrupted the country’s success story. It initiated a series of 
events (Philips 2004: 202) that were called war, staged war, near war, armed conflict, 
terrorism, drama, crisis or simply “2001”. The violence was perpetrated by the (Albanian) 
National Liberation Army (UÇK in Albanian, ONA in Macedonian) and it led to fighting 
between this paramilitary group and the Macedonian military and police forces. What 
objectives the UÇK9 was in pursuit of, remained very contentious even among the Albani-
ans. Initially members of the UÇK said that they wanted to liberate Albanian-populated 
 
 
6  By doing so in no case do I embrace any of the positions of the Macedonian government in its quarrel 
with Greece over the name of the state. 
7  I use diacritical signs to transcribe Cyrillic names in the Latin alphabet. 
8  I made the calculation myself on the basis of the data in: Republic of Macedonia State Statistical Office 
2005: 34f. 
9  I use Macedonian abbreviations for Albanian organizations. However, I made an exception for the UÇK 
because German-speaking readers know it by this name. 
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areas from “Macedonian oppressors” and join them to Kosovo or Albania (Ackermann 
2001: 119; Naegele 2001; Rozen 2001). Just a few weeks later, however, a different argument 
became predominant: the UÇK claimed to be fighting for more rights for the Albanians and 
in doing so it took up the very demands that the Albanian parties had been making since 
Macedonia became independent in 1991. Thereby the UÇK ceased to expressly challenge 
Macedonia’s territorial integrity (Daskalovski 2006: 76f; Rusi 2004). The Democratic Party 
of Albanians (DPA in Macedonian, PDSh in Albanian), a member of the government 
coalition since 1998, rejected this interpretation saying that the sole objective of the war was 
to oust the party from the government (Dnevnik, 21.4.2003). Many observers in academia 
also believed that this was less of a conflict between the Albanians and the Macedonians and 
more of a conflict among the Albanians themselves. Apparently, the UÇK competed with 
the DPA for control over Albanian-populated areas including smuggling routes (Pearson 
2002: 3f). 
At first, high-ranking representatives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and the European Union (EU) called the UÇK members terrorists or criminal 
extremists and backed the actions of the Macedonian government. Also due to solidarity 
with the government, the EU concluded a Stabilization and Association Agreement with 
Macedonia in April 2001. Later, the EU and NATO requested the Macedonian security 
forces to exercise military restraint and successfully pressed for a “government of national 
salvation”. The government composed of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), the 
DPA and the Liberal Party (LP), was expanded to include the former opposition Social 
Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), the Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity 
(PDP) and also the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Accompanied primarily by pressure 
and assistance from the EU and USA the government of national salvation negotiated a 
framework agreement, which was agreed in Ohrid and signed by the four largest political 
parties in Skopje on August 13, 2001 (Framework Agreement 2001). As requested by the 
Macedonian parties, as well as by the EU, NATO and USA, the UÇK did not participate 
directly in the talks but accepted the agreement.10 The Framework Agreement put an end 
to the armed conflict, which had claimed the lives of some 150 to 190 people and forced 
140,000 to 150,000 people to leave their homes (Daskalovski 2006: 203; Mitevski 2008: 
167; Sandevski 2009: 30). 
Whatever the primary point of conflict might have been, the main objective of the 
agreement was to improve the status of Macedonia’s Albanian citizens. Many Albanians 
felt they were second-class citizens and therefore they demanded proportional representa-
tion in public institutions, mandatory consensus-based decision-making in parliament on 
certain issues, the introduction of Albanian as second official language, higher education 
in Albanian language, the right to live their culture and express their identity, as well as 
the decentralization of the state (Cekić 2008: 41-44; interview with Ismet Ramadani 2009). 
 
 
10  About the events from the start of the escalation until the Framework Agreement, see Altmann (2003); 
Mitevski (2008); Schlotter (2002), as well as reports by the International Crisis Group (ICG) at 
www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1244&l=1 (24.11.2009). 
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Since they believed that their concerns were being ignored, most Albanians boycotted the 
independence referendum on September 8, 1991. In parliament Albanian representatives 
abstained from the vote on the constitution. Since the independence, Albanian parties 
have, however, always been part of the government (Daskalovski 2006: 64-68, 193; 
Hislope 2003: 139).  
The essence of the Ohrid Agreement is expressed by the formula of “more rights for 
peace”.11 Its objective is to secure the future of democracy and to bring Macedonia closer 
to the EU and NATO. It categorically rejects politically motivated violence. The agree-
ment confirmed that there were no territorial solutions to ethnic issues. The UÇK was 
required to disarm and disband, NATO troops would safeguard the ceasefire and disar-
mament. In return, the “communities” (ethnic groups) should be equally and proportion-
ately represented in local and central institutions. Henceforth, a double majority was 
needed in parliament to adopt any laws directly linked to culture, language and symbols, 
education, personal identity documents, as well as local self-government. These laws 
required a majority of the representatives including a majority of non-Macedonian repre-
sentatives. Any language, if spoken by at least 20 percent of the population, would become 
an official language in addition to Macedonian. The state would have to finance education 
in such languages. Moreover, the Framework Agreement envisioned a decentralization of 
Macedonia. Local authorities received the right to display symbols of the community’s 
ethnic majority next to the signs of the Republic in front of public buildings. Lastly, the 
Ohrid Agreement called for a new population census and, in addition to NATO and the 
EU, it invited the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as well as 
other international organizations, to assist in the implementation of the Agreement’s 
provisions.12 The prospect of amnesty for the UÇK fighters was another important aspect 
of the peace process, even though it was not included in the Framework Agreement. 
The rest of the report will attempt to evaluate the democratization in Macedonia since 
the signing of the Framework Agreement. To this end the report will first have to explain 
how it ascertains the level of democratic institutions of the state and the progress in 
nation-building. 
3.  Criteria of democratic institutions and nation-building 
Democratization means transition to a democracy, which is characterized by the five 
following features (Dahl 1999: 37-40; Schiller 1999: 31-33): 
 
 
11  Vetterlein (2010) offers a detailed analysis of fault lines in Macedonia prior to 2001 and an extensive 
discussion of the Framework Agreement and effects of its implementation. 
12  Ljubomir Danailov Frčkoski took part in the talks as an expert and wrote a part of the draft agreement. In 
the interview (2009) he said: “We had a classical negotiation process with non-papers. 60% of the non-
papers were written by the foreign experts. These drafts, however, had not been prepared before the talks 
but were written on the spot. (...) The framework agreement was no foreign imposition. Internationals 
had a huge responsibility for its contents, but they gave us free zones”. 
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1. Governments and parliaments are elected through secret ballot in free, general, equal, 
competitive, and regular elections. 
2. The elected governments and parliaments possess decision-making powers, which 
are limited only by the rule of law and separation of powers but not by actors or 
structures without democratic legitimacy. 
3. There is freedom of opinion, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of 
movement, and freedom of information. 
4. Citizens have access to pluralistic mass media, which are independent from the state. 
5. Rule of law and separation of powers are well established.  
Democratic institutions and freedoms have to exist in reality and not only in the constitution. 
Moreover, institutions of the state have to be functional, they have to serve as a venue for 
the resolution of substantial political conflicts and have to be relevant for the political life. 
Therefore, I will ascertain the progress achieved in building democratic institutions of the 
state on the basis of five additional criteria: 
6. Political competition takes place without violence or threats of violence. 
7. The democratic institutions exist independently from external actors. 
8. The government and parliament hold meetings and make decisions. 
9. Meetings of the government agencies and parliament are not boycotted. 
10. The conflicting parties possess no illegal ethnically exclusive decision-making struc-
tures (such as parallel parliaments or governments) and separate instruments of coer-
cion (such as party police or militia). 
To what extent Macedonia fulfills the ten criteria can be seen in reports by election 
observers13, human rights activists14, Freedom House15, the European Commission16 and 
in scientific publications. Additionally, the “barometers” of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 
in Macedonia have proven to be a rich source. After a brief review of the point of departure, 
the report will focus on only those criteria whose ratings have changed. This approach is 
designed to show whether efforts of democratization in Macedonia have produced a fully 
developed democracy or only an illiberal (Zakaria 2003) or deficient democracy (Merkel 
et al. 2003). 
 
 
 
 
13  See www.osce.org/odihr-elections/14365.html (20.11.2009). 
14  See www.mhc.org.mk (20.11.2009). 
15  See www.freedomhouse.org (20.11.2009). I used primarily the annual “Nations in Transit” reports to 
obtain information on individual criteria. The Freedom House Democracy Index, on the other hand, was 
not very helpful. It assigns a value from one to seven both to political rights and civil liberties, whereby a 
lower value stands for more democracy. Macedonia was rated 4/4 in 2001, afterwards it always received 
3/3. As this report demonstrates, the level of democracy has changed more than these numbers imply. 
16  See http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia/ 
key-documents/index_en.htm (20.11.2009). 
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Progress in nation-building is illustrated by the following two indicators: 
1. Attitudes of the Macedonian and Albanian citizens to the common state. 
2. Attitudes of the Macedonian and Albanian elites to the common state. 
Public opinion surveys shed light on the attitudes of the citizens over Macedonia. 
There are also data available about citizens’ preferences for options beyond the common 
state or different structures for the Republic of Macedonia, but they cover only part of the 
timeframe of the study. But there are other surveys which document without significant 
gaps to what extent the citizens accept or reject the Framework Agreement and the state 
structure stipulated within it. Other studies ascertain whether the respondents see themselves 
as Macedonian citizens or love the country. 
I studied the attitudes of the political elite regarding the common state on the basis of 
speeches held by leading politicians during election campaigns, at anniversary celebra-
tions of the peace agreement and of national independence, as well as at other important 
events. In this context my most important source was the Macedonian daily newspaper 
Dnevnik, which is believed to be the most reliable print media outlet.17 Moreover, this 
report is based on more than three dozen interviews with politicians and experts. With 
regard to the attitudes of the political elites I was interested in more than just their accep-
tance of Macedonia or the structure of the state. Of equal importance is, whether the elites 
make their acceptance or even demands for alternatives contingent on certain conditions.  
4.  The point of departure after the peace agreement 
Macedonia was by no means a perfect democracy, neither before nor during the conflict, 
but it did have democratic institutions where Albanian representatives played a part. 
Hence, after the end of the hostilities, Macedonia did not need to democratize from 
scratch, it only needed to carry on democratization. Hereinafter I will refer to this task as 
further democratization. After the peace agreement was signed, it was not a question of 
setting up new common democratic structures for the different ethnic groups. On the 
contrary, the focus was on remodeling the existing institutions, as well as reasserting their 
authority in those areas where the UÇK had assumed control. Nation-building faced 
fewer problems too than it did after wars of secession, particularly because in the later 
phases of the armed conflict the UÇK declared that it did not question the borders of 
Macedonia. Furthermore, opinion polls showed that most Albanians were committed to 
the common Macedonian state. 
 
 
17  See www.dnevnik.com.mk (20.11.2009). Quotes without page numbers come from the newspaper’s Inter-
net edition. 
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4.1  The common democratic institutions 
In 2001 Macedonia could look back to regular general presidential, parliamentary and 
local government elections, where a number of parties or candidates ran against each 
other. However, OSCE observers noticed that the 2000 municipal elections fell short of 
many international democratic standards. For example, there were problems with respect 
to safeguarding the secrecy of the ballot and conducting an election process free from 
violence and intimidation (OSCE/ODIHR 2000: 1, 7, 13f). One person died in a shoot-out 
between rival Albanian parties; outbreaks of violence had already occurred in earlier elec-
tions (Helsinki Committee for Human Rights 1999: 1 and 2000: 1). The citizens’ votes did 
not carry the same weight in the parliamentary elections because of the unequal size of 
electoral districts. While one member of parliament represented only 7,000 voters, 
another one represented about 70,000 citizens (Fraenkel 2003: 17). Parliament and govern-
ment possessed decision-making powers, which were generally speaking not curtailed by 
non-democratic actors or structures. However, particularly in the UÇK strongholds as 
well as in other predominantly Albanian-populated communities, the state maintained at 
best a limited presence. The democratic freedoms were considered to be generally guaran-
teed (Commission of the European Communities 2002: 9f). The country had a diverse 
media landscape including many non-state broadcasters and newspapers that offered 
different political perspectives (OSCE/ODIHR 2000: 8). Nevertheless, human rights activists 
complained that the media failed to maintain professional standards during the fighting 
and became hostages to prejudices (Helsinki Committee for Human Rights 2001: 4). 
Courts were believed to be prone to inadmissible political interference. Parliament elected 
all judges, a fact that raised doubts about their independence and professionalism. Public 
service institutions proved to be highly susceptible to corruption (Commission of the 
European Communities 2002: 7f).  
In particular, the elections gave rise to politically motivated violence, however, its scale 
never reached the level of escalation of 2001. The armed conflict was the greatest threat to 
democracy in independent Macedonia. The OSCE, which had maintained a small field 
mission since 1992, along with the EU, NATO and USA made great efforts to contain the 
violence, to shield the democratic structures from the escalation and to assist these institu-
tions in finding a way out of the crisis. The strength of the democracy is demonstrated by 
the fact that it did not fall apart during the armed conflict. In 2001 the government and 
parliament remained capable of making decisions, in fact, the representatives adopted 
many dozens of laws.18 Admittedly, the Parliament conducted only one session during the 
crisis (Petroska-Beska/Nejcevska 2004: 8). Moreover, there was a legacy of boycotts. In 
1994 the VMRO-DPMNE, the strongest party in the 1990 elections, together with the 
Democratic Party boycotted the second round of the parliamentary elections after allega-
tions of irregularities (Karakamiševa 2004: 263f; Škarić 2005: 61-68).19  
 
 
18  See the register in the Služben Vesnik at www.slvesnik.com.mk/default.asp?ItemID=D8C94B5FE87249 
408FFBC368F8952B4A (9.7.2009). 
19  At the time the citizens elected the Parliament by majority vote in 120 electoral districts. 
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In 2001 the UÇK had the largest illegal coercion apparatus. Furthermore, the Lions, a 
mono-ethnic special police unit, had the reputation of being a party militia for the 
VMRO-DPMNE (Helsinki Committee for Human Rights 2001: 2; Ordanoski 2004: 24-27). 
4.2  Progress in nation-building 
According to a US State Department survey, only 16% of the Albanian respondents 
demanded a Greater Albania during the crisis, while 71% favored a multi-ethnic Republic 
of Macedonia (Judah 2001). In fact, most of the Albanians accepted the external borders 
of Macedonia but they objected to the existing institutions. 97% of them complained that 
non-Macedonians had fewer rights. Only four percent of Macedonian respondents agreed 
with this (UNDP 2001: 22).  
A survey in late August 2001 revealed that 51% of Macedonian respondents opposed 
the signing of the Framework Agreement, while 44% of them supported it. On the other 
hand, 78% of Albanian respondents endorsed it (Gaber-Damjanovska/Jovevska 2001: 19). 
At the end of 2001 the International Republican Institute (IRI) ascertained that a narrow 
relative majority of 49% of all respondents supported the Ohrid Agreement (IRI/USAID 
2008: slide 9). It can be assumed from these figures that at least 78% of the Albanians 
approved of the agreement. Hence, the overall approval by 49% of respondents probably 
indicated that a majority of the Macedonians still rejected the agreement and the remodeling 
of institutions envisaged in it. The Albanians saw a promise in the signing of the agree-
ment, while the Macedonians thought of it as an imposition. 
The attitude of the political elite to the Ohrid covenants is demonstrated by a parlia-
mentary debate about the introduction of the constitutional reforms required by the a-
greement. 91 of the 120 members of Parliament approved of it (Dnevnik, 7.9.2001), 
including all Albanian representatives and all parliamentarians from the Social Democratic 
Union and the Liberal Democratic Party. A majority in the strongest faction, that of the 
VMRO-DPMNE, also supported the constitutional reforms. The fact that it did so even 
though it did not trust the agreement is proved by Prime Minister Ljupčo Georgievski’s 
statements: he did not believe in the agreement, but it was necessary to accept it. Mace-
donia was ostensibly under an informal economic embargo. Georgievski also said: 
“Macedonia is under big pressure by the foreign experts that whoever votes for the con-
stitutional changes is for peace, but those who vote against are for war” (Gaber-
Damjanovska/Jovevska 2001: 7f). On the other hand, Abdurahman Aliti from the Alba-
nian PDP declared that he had always protested against the second-class citizen status of the 
Albanians. But after the adoption and implementation of the Framework Agreement he had 
nothing left to complain about. The Democratic Alternative, which had received eleven 
percent of the votes in the 1998 parliamentary elections, and a splinter group from the 
VMRO-DPMNE voted unanimously against the introduction of the constitutional reforms 
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(Gaber-Damjanovska/Jovevska 2001: 9). The Democratic Alternative criticized the signing 
of the agreement as a threat to national interests (Dnevnik, 14.8.2001). 20 
At large, the point of departure in Macedonia was as follows: there existed democratic 
institutions in which both Macedonian and Albanian parties operated. Therefore, the 
further democratization only required a remodeling of the common democratic struc-
tures rather than having to set up new ones from scratch. But even such a reform would 
have been blocked if the conflicting parties had rejected it as being contrary to their con-
cept of the state. Most Albanians supported the remodeling measures as envisaged in the 
Framework Agreement. In case the Ohrid Agreement were not implemented, it is uncertain 
whether the Albanians would still accept a common state with the Macedonians. The 
implementation of the Framework Agreement appeared to be precarious insofar as the 
majority of the Macedonians rejected it. The two most important Macedonian parties 
were among the signatories of the Ohrid Agreement and it was the largest one of them, 
the VMRO-DPMNE, that explicitly expressed its reservations. For this reason the further 
democratization of Macedonia did indeed appear to be threatened by the initially 
mentioned vicious circle. 
The subsequent chapters will deal with two phases, as identified in the course of nation-
building, after the signing of the peace agreement. The second part of 2006 marks the 
change from the first (2002-2006) to the second phase (2006-2009). Until the end of the first 
stage Albanian citizens and politicians showed increasingly greater commitment to the 
Republic of Macedonia. In the fall of 2006 the number of supporters of the Framework 
Agreement was at its peak and there had never been so few opponents. This happened after 
the government was formed by the VMRO-DPMNE and DPA, the very parties in which the 
Framework Agreement had been questioned most explicitly.  
5.  2002-2006: Democracy under “Guns ’n’ Roses” 
After the 2002 elections the government was formed by a coalition that observers nicknamed 
“Guns ’n’ Roses” (ICG 2002: 2). The “Guns” stood for a party that had for the most part 
emerged from the UÇK, the “Roses” alluded to the symbol of the Social Democrats. The 
transformation of the UÇK and the curbing of politically motivated violence were the 
greatest achievements of the further democratization. Nevertheless, the elections took 
place again in an environment of violence and irregularities. Boycotts of parliamentary 
sessions and the precarious independence of the judiciary were persistent democratic 
deficits. Between 2002 and 2006 the Albanian citizens showed greater loyalty to the 
Republic of Macedonia, while the majority of the Macedonians rejected the Framework 
Agreement. Only fringe organizations openly repudiated the Ohrid Agreement and the 
common Macedonian state. 
 
 
20  As for the other ethnic parties, the Turks and the Bosnians welcomed the agreement, while the Democ-
ratic Party of Serbs rejected it (Dnevnik, 15.8.2001). 
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5.1  The remodeling of institutions 
The obvious decline in politically motivated violence and the curbing of illegal apparatuses 
of coercion signified the greatest accomplishments in democratization between 2002 and 
the summer of 2006. The signatures to the Ohrid Agreement put an end to the UÇK 
attacks as well as to clashes between UÇK and the security forces of Macedonia. When the 
parliament passed an amnesty law in March 2002, most of the UÇK commanders aban-
doned their plans to prepare their units for new hostilities (Bieley 2002). The amnesty 
would, however, not apply to individuals who had committed war crimes (Brunnbauer 
2001: 364). A large number of the UÇK leaders made the transition “from bullets to ballots” 
and went into party politics. Many of them established the Democratic Union for Integration 
in June 2002 (DUI in Macedonian, BDI in Albanian). Ali Ahmeti, who had acted as the 
UÇK “political representative” in 2001, became the spearhead of the DUI. However, the 
new party also involved people like the social scientist Teuta Arifi, who had nothing to do 
with the UÇK (Pettifer 2002). In its founding platform the DUI called for implementation 
of the Framework Agreement in full, a multi-ethnic Macedonia where all citizens would 
be free and equal, as well as integration into European and Atlantic structures (DUI 
2002). Just how important these integration aspirations are for the DUI can be seen from 
the fact that in front of its party headquarters next to the Albanian flag and the party flag 
you can also find the flags of the EU, NATO and the US. But the DUI never hoisted the 
flag of the Republic of Macedonia. Outside of state buildings DUI politicians are rarely 
seen next to the Macedonian flag. 
The Framework Agreement cleared the way to legitimate politics for the UÇK members. 
Even though the UÇK was barred from the direct negotiations on the agreement, its ob-
jectives were, however, largely consistent with Ahmeti’s demands. By the time the DUI 
was founded, the Ohrid Agreement had already proven that it did not just exist on paper. 
In November 2001 parliament had adopted the necessary constitutional changes by more 
than a three-fourths majority (Dnevnik, 17.11.2001), and there were further efforts to 
implement the agreement. NATO and the EU acted as guarantor powers for this process. 
The primary mission of the NATO peacekeeping force (Task Force Harvest)21 was to 
inspect the disarmament of the UÇK, but its presence also signaled how important the 
implementation of all the provisions of the Framework Agreement was for the Alliance. 
The ethnic groups in Macedonia were united in their desire for the country to join the 
European Union, over 90% of the citizens supported such membership (IRI 2008: slide 
15). The EU made it repeatedly clear that only a complete implementation of the Frame-
work Agreement would pave the way to accession (Ilievski/Taleski 2009: 360). 
 
 
21  Information about this mission (August 27 through September 26, 2001) is available at www.nato. 
int/fyrom/tfh/home.htm. It was superseded by the Task Force Fox until December 15, 2002 (www.nato. 
int/fyrom/tff/home. htm), the NATO Operation Allied Harmony until March 31, 2003 (www.nato.int/ fy-
rom/ah/home.htm) and the EUFOR until December 15, 2003 (www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage. 
aspx?id=594&lang= En). All webpages accessed on 20.11.2009. 
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However, Albanian armed groups did not disappear completely after the emergence of 
the DUI. The Albanian National Army (ANA in Macedonian, AKSh in Albanian) had 
been formed before the UÇK, but it was not militarily independent in 2001. The ANA 
aspired to create a Greater Albania and rejected the Ohrid Agreement (Lipsius 2001: 
472-475). A confrontation between the ANA and former UÇK militants occurred in late 
March 2002 in which four people died (Bieley 2002). A couple of months later the ANA 
claimed responsibility for the murder of two Macedonian police officers (Alagjozovski 
2002). In late August 2003, for instance, it detonated a bomb in front of government 
offices in Skopje, in response to which the Macedonian security forces launched the largest 
operation since 2001 (Dnevnik, 1.9.2003 and 9.9.2003). 
The dissolution of the Lions special unit, which was considered to be an armed branch 
of the VMRO-DPMNE, contributed to further curbing of illegal apparatuses of coercion 
(Commission of the European Communities 2004: 31). The EU had insisted on this 
measure but with the SDSM in the government it was preaching to the converted. 
Another positive development was the growing number of laws adopted in the process 
of the Framework Agreement implementation. In 2002 alone the parliament passed 142 
laws, and over the following few years the official gazette never published fewer than a 100 
laws.22 Moreover, the democratic institutions survived the withdrawal of the peacekeeping 
forces, which were first led by NATO and subsequently by the EU, in late 2003. Observers 
acknowledged improved media coverage in contrast to 2001; hate speech appeared only 
seldom (Helsinki Committee for Human Rights 2004: 5). 
One deficiency in democracy that remained concerned elections: observers recorded 
violent incidents, including fatalities in 2002, and a number of irregularities. Group vot-
ing violated the secrecy of the ballot; in a number of polling stations citizens cast votes on 
behalf of other people. Moreover, there was ballot stuffing, intimidation of voters in some 
places and violations of counting rules. The irregularities were concentrated in the western 
part of the country (OSCE/ODIHR 2002, 2004, 2005b and 2006). What should be 
appraised positively is that a reform of the electoral system removed the problem of the 
unequal weight of cast ballots. Since 2002 the citizens elect 120 members of parliament in 
six electoral districts of roughly 280,000 eligible voters each. The voting system is now 
based on proportional representation (OSCE/ODIHR 2002: 4). It was noticeable that 
violence was more pronounced during the parliamentary elections in 2002 and 2006 than 
during the 2004 presidential elections and 2005 municipal elections 
As endorsed by more than 180,000 citizens a referendum on the new municipal 
boundaries, which the government had adopted during the process of decentraliza-
tion, took place in November 2004. The government called upon the voters to abstain 
from the referendum so it would fail for lack of quorum. Those who went to the polls 
anyway revealed themselves as opponents of the municipal redistricting reform. The 
 
 
22 See the data at www.slvesnik.com.mk/default.asp?ItemID=D8C94B5FE87249408FFBC368F8952B4A 
(9.7.2009). 
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government’s boycott appeal undermined the principle of a secret ballot (OSCE/ 
ODIHR 2005: 4). 
The violence during the election campaigns cannot be seen as a rejection of the common 
democracy, because it occurred primarily within one ethnic group and not between the 
Macedonians and the Albanians. Indeed, the conclusion of the Ohrid Agreement 
strengthened the propensity for violence because even though the UÇK was not allowed 
to participate directly in the Ohrid talks its violence had paid off. This might put a strain 
on Macedonian democracy for a long time (interview with professor of political science 
Biljana Vankovska). Admittedly, there had been violent incidents in earlier election 
campaigns too, so the events of 2001 cannot completely explain this problem. Observers, 
activists and politicians criticize the extent to which all parties in every government 
attempted to bring administrative agencies and other public institutions under their con-
trol, both at the central level and in the communities, in order to reward their supporters 
with jobs there. Given the extremely weak private economy, the material existence of 
many people depends on whether “their” party is in government (interviews with Valon 
Bela and Arjanit Hoxha). “You cannot work in a public toilet, if you do not support the 
political party in government”, Mersel Bilalli, a former PDP Member of Parliament, ex-
plained in an interview. Still it is not convincing to explain the violence by arguing that 
this “partyization” puts so much at stake in elections for many people. Because this argu-
ment would apply not only to the western region, but also to other parts of the country that 
do not suffer from similar problems with violence. One reason why there is a higher level 
of violence in the western region could be that government agencies had had a signifi-
cantly weaker and ineffective presence there for a long time, and they could enforce the 
state’s monopoly on a legitimate use of force to a lesser extent. Proponents of culturalist 
theories may also point to the culture of carrying weapons. 
Just as before 2001, boycotts continued to torment parliament in the subsequent years. 
After the 2002 elections the VMRO-DPMNE absented itself from parliamentary sessions 
in protest against the DUI participation in the government coalition (Fraenkel 2003: 8). 
The DPA boycotted parliament in 2003, then the second round of the 2005 municipal 
elections, and again parliament until February 2006 (Commission of the European Com-
munities 2006: 5; Gaber-Damjanovska/Jovevska 2005a: 11). However, these boycotts were 
not aimed against the common democracy but against the government and mainly 
against the fact of not being represented in the government. Whatever the objectives of 
the boycotts might have been, they damaged democracy in any case.  
With regard to the rule of law, the dependence of judges on politicians continued to be 
a problem. However, parliament adopted a number of reforms in 2005 in order to reduce, 
among other things, the influence of the parties on the appointment of judges. A Judicial 
Council composed of 15 persons received a mandate to appoint and discipline judges by a 
two-thirds majority. Eight members were to be judges and to be elected by the judges, five 
members were to be elected by parliament, and the Minister of Justice and the President 
of the Constitutional Court would complete the members of the Council. Corruption 
remained a major problem (Commission of the European Communities 2006: 9-11). 
Neither the precarious independence of the courts, nor the corruption stemmed from the 
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inter-ethnic conflict over the structure of the state or from the much feared vicious circle 
of the insufficient development of state institutions and deficient nation-building. On the 
contrary, this lack of democracy is part of the legacy of a long authoritarian rule and re-
flects the absence of democratic attitudes. The corruption, however, is also rooted in the 
weakness of state institutions, which at least in part stems from the quarrel between the 
ethnic groups. 
5.2  Growing loyalty towards the state, broader acceptance of reforms 
Despite all efforts to implement the Framework Agreement, the Albanians’ approval of a 
Greater Albania increased from 16% in May 2001 to 48% in May 2002. This was at odds 
with the fact that at the same time 68% of Albanian respondents supported the common 
state of Macedonia (Judah 2002). In early 2003, however, only 24% demanded full inde-
pendence for Albanian-populated areas, while 12% of the Macedonians wanted a state 
without the Albanians (UNDP 2003: 41). In the subsequent years none of the studies 
asked questions about options outside of the common state. Nevertheless, the attitudes of 
the Albanians towards Macedonia can be deduced from responses to other questions. For 
example, in 2003 only 17% of the Albanians said they loved Macedonia. In contrast to 
this, 82% said they did in November 2005 and even 88% in May 2006. At the same time 
78% of the Albanians identified themselves as Macedonian citizens (Causidis 2006; 
UNDP 2005: 37 and 2006b: 41). But the Macedonians did not notice any growing loyalty 
on the part of the Albanians towards Macedonia. In February 2006, 44% of them insinuated 
that there were ethnic groups in Macedonia that threatened the sovereignty of the state 
(UNDP 2006a: 15). 63% of the Macedonians believed that the Albanians did not think of 
Macedonia as their homeland(UNDP 2006b: 16). Evidently, improvements in the status 
of the Albanians, which were achieved in the course of the Framework Agreement 
implementation, strengthened their allegiance to Macedonia. The institutional reform 
enhanced the acceptance of the state among the Albanians so that contrary to the pre-
sumed vicious circle the endeavors of state remodeling have led to progress in terms of 
nation-building on the part of the Albanians. 
The ethnic groups still differed in their perceptions of the Framework Agreement. In 
March 2002, 84% of the Albanians but only 13% of the Macedonians considered the full 
implementation of the Ohrid Agreement to be a priority for peace and stability. 43% of 
the Macedonians but merely 6% of the Albanians believed that the peace deal demanded 
excessively extensive reforms (Irwin 2002: 63-66). In May 2002, 90% of the Albanians 
supported the agreement, whereas 63% of the Macedonians rejected it (Judah 2002). Until 
2006 the acceptance was highly variable, but it was only in June 2002 and in March 2004 
that a majority of all the respondents rejected the agreement (IRI 2008: slide 9). Apparently, 
the Macedonians refused to support the Ohrid Agreement throughout (virtually) the 
whole period of time. Many of them interpreted its provisions as a reward for violence. 
Moreover, they had no appreciation of the required reforms because Macedonia had long 
been considered a model, among other things, due to its multi-ethnic governments. What 
was meant to improve the status of the Albanians was seen by many Macedonians as their 
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particular loss, to some extent with justification. Increasing the representation of the 
Albanians in public institutions implied that henceforth fewer Macedonians could find 
employment there. 
Significantly, the only Albanian party in attendance at the first anniversary celebration 
of the Ohrid Agreement was the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) (Dnevnik, 
14.8.2002). Many Macedonians assessed the agreement as a defeat, and it certainly did 
not boost the Macedonian acceptance of the peace deal when Ahmeti triumphantly 
announced at a DUI party congress: “We have won the war” (Dnevnik, 14.8.2002). 
In the 2002 electoral campaign the political parties did not exactly make the contents 
of the Framework Agreement their central focus. Thus, they indirectly confirmed that 
there was no alternative to it. The parliamentary elections yielded a coalition government 
between the SDSM, LDP and DUI. Former UÇK militants joined the very government 
against which they had fought less than a year and a half earlier.  
Politicians and organizations that rejected the common Macedonian state or the 
Framework Agreement remained on the fringes during the 2002-2006 legislative period. 
While the Albanian National Army presented the biggest military challenge, it was the 
former Prime Minister Georgievski who launched the fiercest political assault. In an 
editorial in the daily newspaper Dnevnik (18.4.2003) he demanded that the former Yugo-
slav republics should be divided according to ethnicity and a wall should be built between 
Albanians and Macedonians. Georgievski’s statement elicited heavy criticism. The ruling 
SDSM considered the former Prime Minister’s ideas to be a threat to peace (Dnevnik, 
19.4.2003). In a joint letter representatives of the EU, the US, NATO and OSCE empha-
sized that the Ohrid Agreement was the only way forward while alternative options would 
obstruct Euro-Atlantic integration (Dnevnik, 22.4.2003). The Macedonian President 
Boris Trajkovski (VMRO-DPMNE) and Albania’s government also reiterated their 
commitment to the Framework Agreement (Dnevnik, 23.4.2003). Georgievski alienated 
himself so much from the VMRO-DPMNE that he later left the party. The DPA, however, 
indicated that they understood his point of view. Its leadership believed that the Ohrid 
Agreement was dead, that there was no hope for a multi-ethnic Macedonia, and mono-
ethnic states would be the best option (Petruseva 2003; Dnevnik, 21.4.2003). But in the 
subsequent years even the DPA did not consistently reject the Framework Agreement and 
the common Macedonian state. Like the PDP, on some occasions it demanded the crea-
tion of new states, provided that the implementation of the Framework Agreement failed 
(Dnevnik, 14.7.2003; 15.7.2003; 15.9.2003; 8.4.2004 and 10.4.2004; Gaber-Damjanovska/ 
Jovevska 2003: 19). However, before the 2004 presidential elections the DPA urged the 
Albanians to defend the agreement like a mother would defend her child (Dnevnik, 
9.4.2004). In November of the same year, along with all the other stakeholder parties, it 
signed a “Euro-Atlantic Declaration”, which, among other things, reaffirmed the Ohrid 
Agreement (Gaber-Damjanovska/Jovevska 2004: 13f). 
Despite the achievements in the implementation of the Framework Agreement the 
Albanian politicians had obvious problems with showing their loyalty to Macedonia. The 
official anniversary celebration of the country’s independence on September 8, 2003 took 
place without the Albanian ministers and members of parliament (Dnevnik, 9.9.2003). A 
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year later DUI representatives did in fact take part in the celebrations, but the party leader 
Ahmeti was absent (Dnevnik, 9.9.2004). At a party congress in November 2005 Ahmeti 
reaffirmed his earlier statement that Macedonia was his homeland (Gaber-Damjanovska/ 
Jovevska 2005b: 32f). However, just like the DPA, in its election campaign the DUI only 
displayed the black double-headed eagle against a red background, the flag of Albania and 
the Albanians, but not the Macedonian flag (Gaber-Damjanovska/ Jovevska 2006a: 22f). 
6.  2006-2009: Rebirth of the VMRO-DPMNE, survival of the agreement 
In the run-up to the 2006 elections the VMRO-DPMNE campaigned for a rebirth, and 
after its defeat at the polls in 2002 it succeeded four years later in coming back as the 
strongest party in Macedonia. Together with the parties making up its pre-election 
coalition and more importantly the DPA, the New Social Democratic Party, a splinter 
group of the SDSM, and two additional small parties it formed a new government. In 
snap elections in 2008 the alliance around the VMRO-DPMNE again achieved the best 
result; this time, however, it brought the DUI into the government instead of the DPA. 
The rebirth of the VMRO-DPMNE was by no means the death of the Framework Agree-
ment, even though critics reproached the party for implementing the provisions of the 
Agreement only under pressure. Furthermore, only marginal forces opposed the Ohrid 
Agreement or the common state. Albanian politicians avowed their loyalty to Macedonia. 
However, greater progress in democratization failed to materialize, and there were even 
negative tendencies as far as independent media were concerned.  
6.1  Democracy with some faults 
The parliament dissolved itself23 in 2008, new elections followed, in which, according to 
observers, democratic standards were not implemented. During the election campaign, 
especially in the Albanian areas numerous violent incidents occurred, including shots 
being fired at Ahmeti. One person died on election day. In view of the many irregularities 
recorded, the election commission ordered a re-vote at around 200 polling stations 
(OSCE/ODIHR 2008: 1, 10 and 18-24). The 2009 presidential and municipal elections 
provided a better picture, with observers now declaring that most international standards 
had been met. There were only sporadic violent incidents, although the observers 
reported many cases of voter intimidation by supporters of the ruling parties across the 
country (OSCE/ODIHR 2009: 1 and 11f). The electoral register raised doubts since almost 
88% of the population was allegedly eligible to vote. This was not only a high proportion 
in comparison to other countries, but also exceeded the previous figure for the number of 
persons eligible to vote by eight percentage points (Dnevnik, 10.3.2009). The press also 
 
 
23 See the data at www.slvesnik.com.mk/default.asp?ItemID=D8C94B5FE87249408FFBC368F8952B4A 
(9.7.2009). 
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reported cases of government officials campaigning during their working hours with pub-
lic funds for the party that had helped them get their jobs (Dnevnik, 9.3.2009). 
Even during earlier presidential elections there had been less violence than during the 
parliamentary elections. Violence had occurred above all in areas primarily inhabited by 
Albanians; the presidential elections however were of no interest to the Albanians because 
only Macedonian candidates were competing in them. Parliamentary elections on the 
other hand determined which party could supply its supporters with posts and income. 
The same naturally applied to the municipal elections. The fact that the 2009 municipal 
elections proceeded with relatively little violence can be put down to the severe criticism 
by external powers of the events of 2008. In 2009 the EU held out the prospect of a date 
being set for the start of accession negotiations if the elections were democratic and 
reforms were implemented (Dnevnik, 11.3.2009).  
In 2009 the EU assessed the range of freedoms as satisfactory (Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities 2009: 18). However, the aforementioned instances of intimidation 
undermined these freedoms. Furthermore, the Vice-President of the SDSM, Gordan 
Georgiev, complained: “In small towns, people are afraid to talk to me, when they know I 
am from the opposition” (interview). The political adviser Eben Friedman added that 
many people believed that they were under state surveillance (interview). 
There was an alarming development in the media. The VMRO-DPMNE-led government 
promoted its ideas in huge campaigns and thus became the most important advertising 
client. Critics saw in this a growing dependency of the media on the state (OSCE/ODIHR 
2009: 14). A lack of professionalism and a concentration of private media in the hands of 
politicians or their closest relatives were considered to be further problems (interview 
with Biljana Bejkova). Occasionally, journalists were attacked or threatened. 
Despite some progress in the rule of law, the EU continued to question the independence 
of part of the judiciary (Commission of the European Communities 2009: 57). The legal 
expert Aleksander Spasov described the situation as follows: judges did indeed now appoint 
their colleagues via the judicial council, but many of the incumbent judges had come to 
office at a time when professional qualifications and integrity were not crucial criteria. 
Unlike in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the posts for all judges were not re-advertised (interview).  
Many politicians followed the motto “law is what suits me”. The reaction of Albanian 
parties to a judgment pronounced by the constitutional court on the use of flags demon-
strated this. The PDP demanded the resignation of the judges, the DPA suspected a plan 
for destabilization, while Ahmeti announced that municipalities with a mayor belonging 
to his party would ignore the judgment (Gaber-Damjanovska/Jovevska 2007: 31f). 
Violence and threats of violence remained a major problem, and not only during elec-
tion campaigns. In the 2006 parliamentary elections the DUI in fact achieved the best 
result among the Albanian parties, but still on the Macedonian side the victorious 
VMRO-DPMNE did not want to form a government with it. The DUI alleged that the 
VMRO-DPMNE in the future intended to ignore the principle of the double majority that 
had been provided for certain questions. DUI representatives subsequently threatened not 
only to destabilize the country but even to get their Kalashnikovs out (Gaber-
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Damjanovska/Jovevska 2006b: 8). In September 2007 members of the DUI, DPA and PDP 
got into a fight in parliament, and DUI and DPA “security forces” clashed with the police 
in front of the building (Balkan Insight, 25 and 26.9.2007; Gaber-Damjanovska/Jovevska 
2007: 9). These incidents once again illustrated the absence of democratic attitudes on the 
part of those involved and supported the impression that these parties had groups of 
thugs or even party militia at their disposal. 
With the new governments from 2006 onwards the parliament passed a great number 
of laws, and this was contrary to the fear that a procedure like the double majority would 
cripple the decision-making process. Zoran Ilievski, adviser to the President of Mace-
donia, stressed that power-sharing between Macedonians and Albanians had not delayed 
a single law (interview). 24 Ljubomir Danailov Frčkoski also saw no obstacles, and said 
with regard to the double majority: “Some poison in a small quantity is a medicine” 
(interview). Irfan Arsani, Ahmeti’s chief of administration, also believed that power-
sharing between Macedonians and Albanians worked. He did, however, complain that the 
VMRO-DPMNE withheld key ministries and other top-ranking appointments from the 
DUI (interview). 25 The DUI Member of Parliament Ermira Mehmeti criticized that the 
VMRO-DPMNE wanted the Macedonian ministers to deal only with Macedonian interests 
and the Albanian ministers only with Albanian affairs. Through this, the powers of the 
Albanian ministers would be severely restricted and the democratic institutions would 
appear to be disintegrating (interview). Aleksander Spasenovski, a Member of Parliament 
from the VMRO-DPMNE, rejected such accusations: “No one is pushing the Albanians to 
the margins” (interview). 
Boycotts continued to plague the democratic institutions. In 2008 the SDSM left par-
liament for two and a half weeks, among other reasons because the new government 
majority adopted over 170 laws through a fast-track procedure. The DPA boycotted 
parliament in 2008 and again from August 2009 on (Commission of the European 
Communities 2008: 9; Dnevnik, 19.8.2009). The DUI, which was at that time in the 
opposition, started the most important boycott for inter-ethnic relations in 2006/2007 
together with the PDP and protested through this against what it perceived as the govern-
ment’s failure to observe the double majority principle (Commission of the European 
Communities 2007: 6f). The DUI ended its boycott after it had reached a number of 
agreements with the VMRO-DPMNE (Dnevnik, 30.5.2007) Present at this agreement 
were representatives of the EU delegation and US embassy, which had previously pushed 
for reconciliation between the government and the opposition. Without abnegating the 
tradition of boycotting, the political scientist Židas Daskalovski saw in the actions of 
external powers an incentive for such steps: “When someone boycotts the parliament, 
Americans are very concerned and try to get them back into the parliament. They pressure 
the government to find some compromise” (interview). Similarly Lidija Hristova, profes-
 
 
24 See the data at www.slvesnik.com.mk/default.asp?ItemID=D8C94B5FE87249408FFBC368F8952B4A 
(9.7.2009). 
25 See the data at www.slvesnik.com.mk/default.asp?ItemID=D8C94B5FE87249408FFBC368F8952B4A 
(9.7.2009). 
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sor of political science, claimed: “The politicians do not want to fight openly but prefer to 
blackmail, as they know that the international community will pressure the government 
to compromise” (interview).  
A member of the EU presence in Macedonia26 denied that the external powers solved 
problems that would not even arise without them. The animosities between the parties 
were real, and there was in fact an absence of cooperation (interview). In response to the 
question whether the democratic institutions could collapse without the external actors, 
he referred to the conflict surrounding an encyclopedia which the Macedonian Academy 
of Science and Art presented in September 2009. This described the Albanians in derogatory 
terms and did not include them among the autochthonous population of Macedonia. 
Since the Academy served as the mouthpiece of the ruling VMRO-DPMNE, the Albanian 
parties demanded that the book be withdrawn from the market and that Prime Minister 
Nikola Gruevski (VMRO-DPMNE) distance himself from it. When this initially failed to 
happen, Ahmeti went as far as saying that the encyclopedia had broken the ceasefire 
between Macedonians and Albanians. Following a joint declaration by Ahmeti and 
Gruevski the conflict subsided (Dnevnik, 19.-24.9.2009 and 28.-30.9.2009). My interviewee 
from the EU presence explained that the quarrel over the encyclopedia had brought 
Macedonia very close to the events of 2001. Only international elements behind the 
scenes had reconciled Gruevski and Ahmeti. Things could also have been much worse 
during the 2008 elections without the action of external powers. Ahmeti’s chief of admini-
stration did not want to confirm the international role in the conflict surrounding the 
encyclopedia, but did say of the external powers: “The state would collapse without the 
external presence. Its help is needed on the way to EU and NATO. Without the external 
presence, the Framework Agreement would not be implemented and we would come to 
the situation like before 2001” (interview with Irfan Asani).  
Where Macedonia fell short of the demands of democracy, this was due only to a lesser 
extent, if at all, to insufficient nation-building, that is a lack of acceptance of the common 
state or its structures. Thus these shortcomings could not be a consequence of the much 
feared vicious circle. The reasons for the violence, electoral irregularities, party influence 
over public institutions, the precarious independence of judges and most of the boycotts 
were rather a legacy of undemocratic rule and the weak commitment of the political elite 
to democratic values. Admittedly, the DUI parliamentary boycott was linked to the inter-
ethnic dispute surrounding the need for the double majority. The prominent role of 
external powers stemmed at least in part from the fact that the ethnic groups could not 
resolve their disputes within the democratic institutions. The ethnic division of Mace-
donia resulted in a large number of media. Their small circle of readers, listeners or view-
ers meant that the continued existence of many media depended on the government placing 
adverts. The sociologist Petar Atanasov saw the ethnic conflict not as a cause but rather as 
a consequence of the state of affairs with respect to democracy in Macedonia (interview). 
 
 
26 See the data at www.slvesnik.com.mk/default.asp?ItemID=D8C94B5FE87249408FFBC368F8952B4A 
(9.7.2009). 
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His colleague Lidija Hristova explained this correlation by suggesting that the ethnic 
groups did not perceive the poorly functioning institutions as a general problem. Instead 
they regarded the institutions’ shortcomings as something that affected only their own 
ethnic group (interview). 
6.2  “Macedonia is our state” 
For the last few years there have been no polls as to whether the citizens favored options 
beyond the common democracy. Studies continued, however, to ascertain the attitude 
towards the Ohrid Agreement. The number of people in favor of the Framework Agreement 
was never higher than when the new government came to power. This government was 
formed together with precisely those larger parties – the VMRO-DPMNE and DPA – that 
had criticized the provisions of the peace agreement most. 59% of citizens supported the 
agreement, only 28% rejected it (IRI 2008: slide 9). The fact that the parties they trusted 
pledged their support for the agreement clearly reduced the skepticism on the part of 
many citizens towards the Ohrid agenda. During the following years support for the 
agreement never fell below 50%, while at no point did more than 37% of the citizens reject 
it (IRI 2008: slide 9; Dnevnik, 12.8.2009). These figures should, however, not disguise the 
fact that most of the time a majority of Macedonians rejected the agreement. In a survey 
in 2009 almost 50% of the citizens consulted said the Albanians benefited from the 
Framework Agreement, while around 27% believed all citizens benefited from it. 14% of 
those consulted said that inter-ethnic relations had improved after the agreement, a further 
40% believed these relations had improved slightly (IDSCS 2009: slide 12f). 
Even after the change of government in 2006 only marginal forces rejected the com-
mon state or the Framework Agreement. The DPA went back and forth regarding its po-
sition. It distanced itself from Greater Albania (Dnevnik, 17.5.2008), but said in its 2009 
election campaign that Macedonia would cease to exist without NATO accession (Gaber-
Damjanovska/Jovevska 2009: 35). The presidential candidate, Mirushe Hoxha, complained 
that the concept of the state did not reflect the multi-ethnic society; nevertheless she 
called for the Ohrid Agreement to be implemented in full (Dnevnik, 9.3.2009 and 
11.3.2009). On the other hand, on the occasion of the anniversary of the signing of the 
peace accords in August 2009, the DPA declared the Framework Agreement dead 
(Dnevnik, 13.8.2009). 
In 2008 the government organized a celebration for the first time to mark the anniversary 
of the signing of the peace agreement. Ahmeti declared that the agreement’s greatest 
achievement was that all citizens now regarded the state as their own and were loyal to it. 
The agreement also signified a victory for the Macedonians (Dnevnik, 15.8.2008). A few 
years earlier he had still claimed that the UÇK had won the war. 
Rizvan Sulejmani, a former member of parliament and Minister for Local Self-
Government, explained how much the Framework Agreement had accounted for the 
acceptance of Macedonia on the part of the Albanians: “The Framework Agreement was 
decisive to make the Albanians loyal to Macedonia. We got rights in exchange for our 
recognition of the Republic. Macedonia is our state, as we are equal here. Formerly, I as 
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the most moderate of PDP’s members of parliament did not say that Macedonia is my 
state. But since 2001, all Albanian parties have been saying that Macedonia is our state” 
(interview). 
Statements by leading politicians in Kosovo made it easier for the Albanians in 
Macedonia to accept the Republic and not to strive for a Greater Kosovo. Fatmir Sejdiu, 
President of Kosovo, declared that the region was tired of the ideas of a Greater Serbia, 
Greater Albania or Greater Kosovo (Gaber-Damjanovska/Jovevska 2006a: 13). When 
Kosovo declared its independence, Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi rejected a Greater 
Kosovo, calling instead for good relations with all neighbors (Dnevnik, 18.2.2008). The 
political elite in Kosovo knew that they would not win acceptance for their state if they 
questioned the territorial integrity of Macedonia. The Albanians in Macedonia were far 
more aligned with Kosovo than with Albania, after all, Macedonia and Kosovo had both 
belonged to Yugoslavia and many Albanians, including leading members of the UÇK, had 
studied in Pristina. “There are not so strong ties with Albania, as we never have been one 
country”, Irfan Asani explained (interview). More importantly, prior to its democratization 
Albania had cut itself off from the world. If present-day Albania posed any danger to the 
continued existence of Macedonia, the former would have to give up its ambitions of 
Euro-Atlantic integration.  
The DUI expressed its growing acceptance of the Republic of Macedonia in 2006 by 
interrupting its parliamentary boycott for the independence day celebrations in 2006 
(Dnevnik, 9.9.2006). At the same event three years later, the top officials of all the major 
Albanian parties were present at the official reception (Dnevni, 9.9.2009).  
Open criticism or rejection of the Framework Agreement among the ranks of the 
VMRO-DPMNE faded once the former Prime Minister Georgievski had left the party. 
The Members of Parliament Petar Pop-Arsov and Aleksandar Spasenovski reaffirmed 
that the VMRO-DPMNE would implement the peace agreement (interviews). Andrej 
Lepavcov, adviser to Prime Minister Gruevski, even called the Framework Agreement a 
success story (interview). In the introduction to the VMRO-DPMNE 2008 electoral pro-
gram Gruevski wrote: “We will go on with the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement” 
(VMRO-DPMNE 2008: 7). The party had the courage to give its supporters an unpopular 
message. Members of the opposition, the Social Democrats and Albanian politicians, 
mistrusted these statements however. Jovan Despotovski from the SDSM and an anony-
mous fellow member of the party stressed that the VMRO-DPMNE would only agree to 
the implementation of the Framework Agreement under pressure and was not acting out 
of conviction (interviews). 27 Arjanit Hoxha, spokesman for the New Democracy Party, 
which had split from the DPA in 2008, argued that the VMRO-DPMNE was not openly 
against the agreement, but just did not like implementing its provisions (interview). 
Ermira Mehmeti from the DUI, in the government with the VMRO-DPMNE since 2008, 
complained that the largest Macedonian party adhered to a rhetoric that portrayed the 
 
 
27 See the data at www.slvesnik.com.mk/default.asp?ItemID=D8C94B5FE87249408FFBC368F8952B4A 
(9.7.2009). 
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agreement as a loss for the Macedonians and referred to the state as belonging to the 
Macedonians. According to Mehmeti, the VMRO-DPMNE intended to give the state 
back to the Macedonians (interview).  
7.  A look back, forward and beyond Macedonia 
7.1  Looking back: taking stock of democratization 
In ethnically divided post-civil war societies the task that democratization has to tackle is 
two-fold. It has to build or remodel common state institutions in accordance with democratic 
principles; at the same time, all the parties to the conflict must begin to accept the disputed 
state and its new structures. Since both tasks have to be dealt with at the same time, there 
is the threat of a vicious circle emerging in which shortcomings in state-building impede 
nation-building and vice versa. Before I examine the case of Macedonia under considera-
tion of the supposed vicious circle, I will summarize the development of the democratic 
institutions and the acceptance of the common state. 
Even during the escalation of 2001 the Macedonian and Albanian parties operated in 
common democratic institutions. Hence, the further democratization process after the 
conclusion of the peace agreement did not have to build new institutions from scratch but 
merely remodel existing structures. Furthermore, it was essential to get the state challenged 
by the UÇK accepted across the entire area. A lack of democracy manifested itself mainly 
in politically motivated violence, electoral irregularities, a lack of rule of law and boycotts 
of the parliament. Until 2006 democratization proceeded well, thereafter however it failed 
to achieve any further substantial progress. In the years following the peace agreement 
there was some success in curbing politically motivated violence. Macedonia even 
appeared quite stable after the international peacekeeping troops had been withdrawn. 
The judiciary underwent reforms intended to strengthen the independence of the courts. 
But Macedonia could not be classed a full-fledged democracy mainly because of the 
violent incidents and irregularities during elections. 
Even in 2001 the majority of Albanians were not against the Republic of Macedonia. 
As important provisions of the Framework Agreement were implemented, many of them 
said they loved Macedonia. While most Albanians always supported the Ohrid Agreement, 
the majority of Macedonians almost always rejected it. Overall, however, the number of 
critics of the peace agreement went down. Only marginal forces openly opposed the 
common state or the Framework Agreement. On the one hand, Albanian politicians 
showed greater respect for the state, by taking part in the independence day celebrations. 
On the other hand, they flaunted the Albanian flag excessively, and shunned the 
Republic’s flag.28 
 
 
28  The explanation I received from Albanian politicians for this behavior was that the flag had been adopted 
without their involvement. 
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Macedonia was able to escape the vicious circle in which the outstanding tasks of state-
building obstruct nation-building or vice versa. This happened because both the 
democratic institutions and the acceptance of the common state were at a higher base 
level than it is usually the case after violent conflicts over secession. The fact that the 
inter-ethnic dispute focused more on the structures of the state and less on the continued 
existence of the common state itself made further democratization of Macedonia easier. 
For the Albanians the Ohrid Agreement was a promise, for the Macedonians, however, it 
was an imposition. Remodeling the state institutions as stipulated in the peace agreement 
was dependent on whether the Macedonians accepted the new state structure despite 
their major reservations. If they had not done so, the deal of “more rights for peace” and 
the tradeoff of “loyalty for reform” would have fallen through. In that case the lack of 
acceptance for the envisaged state structure would have constrained the remodeling of the 
democratic institutions. 
The Macedonian elite went along with the reforms envisaged in the Ohrid Agreement 
for at least three reasons:  
Firstly, the representatives of the EU and NATO made it clear to them that only the 
implementation of the Framework Agreement would keep the popular prospect of Euro-
Atlantic integration alive. This conditioning possibly worked so well because Macedonia 
was already on the path to rapprochement and did not have to be enticed into the process 
first.  
Secondly, in 2001 Macedonia profited from the political leadership of the then 
President Trajkovski, who resisted the opposition within his own party, the VMRO-
DPMNE, and did much to champion the peace agreement. He trusted that the Macedonians 
would later appreciate the value of the peace agreement. Branko Crvenkovski (SDSM), his 
successor as president, highlighted this political leadership at the memorial service held 
for Trajkovski (Dnevnik, 6.3.2004). Trajkovski was killed in an accident in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in late February 2004.  
Thirdly, over time the skepticism towards the agreement diminished because the fears 
associated with it proved to be unfounded. Zoran Ilievski, adviser to the current President 
Gjorge Ivanov (VMRO-DPMNE), explained: “Macedonians were scared to become 
second-class citizens. But they saw that nothing dramatic happens and things are not 
worse for Macedonians. Moreover, they saw a growing stability” (interview). Professor 
Mirjana Maleska expressed a similar opinion (interview). 
Economic developments did not contribute significantly to the fact that the Mace-
donian citizens and politicians increasingly accepted the implementation of the Frame-
work Agreement. It is true that from 2003 to 2008 the gross domestic product grew annu-
ally between 3.1% and 5.9%.29 However, in terms of per capita GDP and growth, 
 
 
29  Data for 2004 to 2008 available at: www.investinmacedonia.com/Default.aspx?item=menu&itemid=696& 
themeid=304 (18.12.2009); data for 2001 to 2003 in Länderstudie Makedonien in the Bertelsmann Trans-
formation Index (2006: 18). 
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Macedonia was in the same league as Bosnia and Herzegovina.30 Like in that country the 
people of Macedonia saw the economic situation as a massive problem and not least be-
cause of that the Social Democrat-led government of Macedonia lost the parliamentary 
elections in 2006. After 2001 the unemployment rate was never below 30% and for people 
under 24 years of age always higher than 56%.31  
A precondition for reforming the state structures was that the reluctance of the Mace-
donians to go along with this was neutralized. That way insufficient nation-building could 
not stand in the way of the reorganization of the state. The progress in the implementa-
tion of the Framework Agreement meant that the Albanians showed greater loyalty to the 
common state. This, in turn, prompted many Macedonians to accept rather cautiously the 
remodeling of the democratic institutions. 
Macedonia is still a state, which only partly satisfies some of the criteria of democracy. 
Most shortcomings however are due neither to the much feared vicious circle nor to 
inter-ethnic conflicts. It is above all rather the legacy of long authoritarian rule and an 
absence of democratic leanings that hinder further democratization. 
7.2  Looking ahead: the potential for destabilization 
Macedonians and Albanians live in the same country but in different worlds. Macedonians 
and Albanians vote almost exclusively for parties from their own ethnic group, they set 
other, sometimes conflicting political priorities, they make use predominantly of media in 
their language, and they almost always marry people from their own ethnic group and, 
above all, their religion. A large proportion of the citizens live in areas where most 
neighbors belong to the same ethnic group. “There is coexistence but no mixing”, as the 
political adviser Eben Friedman observed (interview). Even if they are involved in non-
governmental organizations, people divide themselves into ethnic categories. The educa-
tion expert Harald Schenker believes that the education system32 is in the process of 
turning into a centrifugal force. The nine largest schools separated Macedonians from 
Albanians, and more than half of the Albanian pupils were affected by this segregation. 
Ethnocentrism has forced its way into the textbooks so nothing is learned about the other 
ethnic groups (interview). A life in parallel spheres can make it easier to mobilize against 
the other ethnic group since such a life offers hardly any opportunity to reduce prejudices 
and stereotypes. The controversy surrounding the encyclopedia is a reminder of how 
quickly tensions in inter-ethnic relations can erupt. It is such a crisis situation that within 
an ethnically segregated society can finally trigger the question whether there has to be a 
common state at all.  
 
 
30  See www.globalpropertyguide.com/Europe/Macedonia/gdp-per-capita and www.globalpropertyguide.com/ 
Europe/Macedonia/gdp-per-capita-5-years (both 18.12.2009). 
31  According to the figures from the Statistical Office at: www.stat.gov.mk/Indikatori/novi%20indikatori/ 
INDIKA TOR45_eng.pdf (18.12.2009). 
32  For the educational system see also Atanasovski (2008) and Vetterlein (2007). 
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However, if you compare the situation in Macedonia with that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
it does not look quite so bleak. In that country the ethnic groups see themselves at the 
(provisional) end of a long series of extremely bloody conflicts, while in Macedonia they 
do not (interview with Hristova). Unlike in Bosnia and Herzegovina the role of Mace-
donia’s religious communities is a constructive one. “Religious communities are more 
cooling down than boiling the inter-ethnic relations. Macedonia had never been radicalized 
on a religious base”, the sociologist Atanasov noted (interview). Despite all the criticism, 
the education system is not designed to create ethno-nationalists (interview with 
Schenker). Likewise election campaigns are clearly less polarized between the ethnic 
groups than is the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The greatest danger for a stable Macedonia comes from a blockade against Euro-
Atlantic integration: “Integration into NATO and the EU is what holds Macedonia 
together. Without the European option, the national option would be an alternative, 
especially for the Albanians”, Andreas Raab from the Ohrid Institute explained (interview). 
Mersel Bilalli feared: “The main fundament for Macedonia is the Euro-Atlantic integra-
tion. If this fundament is destroyed, Macedonia has no perspective to exist as a state” 
(interview).33 Accordingly, the Deputy Chairman of the DUI, Rafiz Aliti, threatened in 
November 2009 that the Albanians would join NATO with or without the Macedonians. 
He said this in light of the quarrel between Macedonia and Greece over the country’s 
name, which posed the greatest obstacle to Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic integration. In 
April 2008 Greece had blocked Macedonia’s admission to NATO. In December 2009 the 
Greek government prevented Macedonia from receiving a date from the EU for the start 
of accession negotiations. The conflict is not limited to the constitutional name “Republic 
of Macedonia”, which Greece regards as an attack on its territorial integrity. The Greek 
government is likewise irked at the self-designation as Macedonians, especially as the 
VMRO-DPMNE portrays the Macedonian citizens as descendents of the ancient Mace-
donians. The Gruevski government renamed the tiny airport in Skopje “Alexander the 
Great Airport” and erected ancient looking statues in front of the government building. 
Buildings intended to lay claim to an ancient heritage are being built in many places. The 
Greek government even rejects the term “Macedonian” for the most widely spoken lan-
guage in this country. Furthermore, Macedonia and Greece are arguing about the condi-
tions for a return of those people who came to the then Yugoslavia as a result of the Greek 
civil war (1946-1949). In addition, Macedonia accuses Greece of discriminating against 
the Slavs in northern Greece, while the Greek government denies their Slavic identity and 
discrimination.34  
The conflict with Greece can put a massive strain on relations between Macedonians 
and Albanians in Macedonia. 69% of the Albanians but only three percent of the Mace-
 
 
33  According to Dane Taleski, political scientist and member of the executive board of the SDSM: “The basic 
consensus here on the common state rests on Euro-Atlantic integration. Without that integration pros-
pect Macedonia could become Lebanon. The acceptance of the state would erode” (interview).  
34  On the conflict between Macedonia and Greece see: Danailov Frčkoski (2009); Engström (2002); Euro-
Balkan (2009). 
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donians thought that the Republic should join NATO and the EU if this meant the loss of 
the present name (GALLUP 2008: 10). If the quarrel about the name were to constrain 
Euro-Atlantic integration, many Albanians would be angry at the Macedonians for 
putting alleged sensitivities regarding their identity above the interests of all the ethnic 
groups in the republic. The Macedonians, on the other hand, are probably frustrated by 
the lack of understanding on the part of the Albanians, especially as they believe in the 
years following the peace agreement they have accommodated many of the Albanians’ 
demands. Without the prospect of accession, there is one less incentive to seek a 
compromise with the other ethnic group. If integration is blocked long term this may 
result in the destructive potential of an ethnically segregated society outlined above being 
unleashed. The continuing problem of politically motivated violence, which is particularly 
evident during elections, also provides cause for concern. If the political situation worsens 
this problem may again change from a primarily intra-ethnic phenomenon into an inter-
ethnic one.  
7.3  The expanded view: Macedonia as a model? 
The prospect of Euro-Atlantic integration overcame some opposition to the Framework 
Agreement and its implementation. The EU can provide incentives for further democrati-
zation in Macedonia, in that it attaches conditions to rapprochement. This strategy of 
conditioning must ensure, however, that it does not play into the hands of precisely those 
actors who do not want too rapid an integration or do not want accession to the European 
Union at all. The large majority of citizens must not be held hostage by a few foot 
draggers and obstructionists. 
The most powerful obstructionist to integration, however, lies outside Macedonia, 
namely Greece. German and international politicians should urge the Macedonian 
government to refrain from provocations such as references to an ancient Macedonian 
heritage. Furthermore, the Macedonian government should be advised not to complicate 
a possible agreement with Greece through procedural hurdles. In holding a referendum 
on a possible compromise with Greece, Prime Minister Gruevski may shift responsibility 
for the failure of a settlement from himself, but his deceased fellow party member 
Trajkovski had demonstrated what political leadership in a positive sense can mean. The 
government of Greece and its supporters within the EU must not lose sight of the following: 
it cannot be in Greece’s own interest to border on an unstable state. Furthermore, the 
Greek government needs to remember that the European communities were ready after 
the end of the military dictatorship to support Greece’s democracy through a very rapid 
start of accession negotiations. Given its minorities policy Greece would have difficulty in 
fulfilling the current criteria for EU accession. Greece cannot see itself as simply a benefi-
ciary of stability, especially since it supported Serbia’s aggressive policy during the violent 
breakup of Yugoslavia. However, I advise against assuming that in view of its acute debt 
crisis Greece would be particularly susceptible to outside pressure. The Greek government 
must currently ask so much of its citizens that it could scarcely risk caving in when it 
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comes to foreign policy. It remains to be seen whether the Greek government uses the 
quarrel over the name as a “lightning rod” as soon as it gets into difficulties at home. 
While Germany and the EU have to fulfill their responsibility to Macedonia, they must 
not allow Macedonia’s politicians to shirk responsibility for democracy and peace. Repre-
sentatives of the EU, NATO and the OSCE are doing the right thing in condemning 
political violence in Macedonia and calling on the Macedonian politicians to distance 
themselves from this violence and take measures to counter it. If there is a lack of democ-
racy it is only right to point it out as such clearly. However, the international presence 
must avoid inadvertently acting as an advocate of party political interests. If it forces the 
government, as happened in 2007, to come to an agreement with an opposition party 
boycotting parliament, it hoodwinks the rules of democracy. Furthermore, it provides an 
incentive for parties to persist in their extreme positions on the assumption that the EU or 
another external power would in any case find a way out of a possible crisis. Democracy 
includes the promise of the freedom to decide one’s own affairs. At the same time, 
democracy imposes the need to bear the consequences of these decisions and take respon-
sibility for them. You cannot have the promises of democracy without its impositions. No 
external aid for democratization can do anything to change this. 
External aid played a significant role in 2001 in preventing the escalation into a major 
war and brought about peace accords relatively quickly in the form of the Ohrid Agree-
ment. This success was reminiscent of the “Macedonian model” that had become a set 
phrase in the 1990s. Several circumstances proved to be essential for this success in 2001. 
NATO, in the form of bases for the peacekeeping troops in Kosovo, and the OSCE were 
already present and familiar with the situation in Macedonia. This created the institu-
tional framework for a greater involvement. A high degree of international consensus 
forced the UÇK to lower its goals to the demands already made by Albanian parties 
earlier. In this way it was already clear which reforms would offer a way out of the escala-
tion. The process of rapprochement already initiated with the EU made it easier for the 
Macedonians to accept the remodeling of the state institutions. The successful prevention 
of a bigger war turned out on balance to be contingent on many factors. In this sense 
Macedonia is not so much a model, which could easily be replicated elsewhere, but rather 
a unique case.  
The same applies to the time after the peace agreement. It is true that the Framework 
Agreement and its implementation can be seen as a success story. For most ethnically 
divided post-civil war societies, however, Macedonia does not offer a recipe for peace 
through democratization. Compared with wars in such places as Bosnia and Herzegovina 
or Lebanon the brief clashes in Macedonia seem like skirmishes. In comparison to conflicts 
of secession like the one in Kosovo the goals of the UÇK appeared modest; and unlike in 
most parts of the world international interest and commitment were high and equipped 
with tools for integration. Common democratic institutions continued to exist even 
during the fighting and thus spared Macedonia the imposition of having to build democratic 
structures completely from scratch after the conclusion of the peace agreement. 
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